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ENCRYPTION SCHEMES USING FINITE FRAMES AND HADAMARD
ARRAYS
RYAN HARKINS, ERIC WEBER, AND ANDREW WESTMEYER
Abstract. We propose a cipher similar to the One Time Pad and McEliece cipher based on
a subband coding scheme. The encoding process is an approximation to the One Time Pad
encryption scheme. We present results of numerical experiments which suggest that a brute
force attack to the proposed scheme does not result in all possible plaintexts, as the One
Time Pad does, but still the brute force attack does not compromise the system. However,
we demonstrate that the cipher is vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose a private key cipher, the idea for which comes from frame theory
and multiple access communications. The cipher has similarities to the Hill cipher, the One
Time Pad, and the McEliece cipher [Menezes et al. 1997, Chabaud 1995]. Indeed, one of the
design goals for our cipher is to approximate the One Time Pad.
Our design goals include the following:
1. Include randomness in the encryption process;
2. Require the key be shared only once;
3. Use a relatively small key size;
4. Computationally fast;
5. Robust to brute force attacks.
Our proposed cipher implements items 1-4 above; the purpose of the present paper is to give
some demonstration of item 5. We remark here that 5 is not sufficient for the cipher to be
a good one, but certainly is necessary. We will demonstrate that this cipher is vulnerable to
a chosen-plaintext attack. It is unknown if this cipher is robust against a known-plaintext
attack.
Our cipher can be described as follows: consider a communications channel; we divide
the channel into two subbands, one which will carry the message, and the other which will
carry noise, or as we call it in this paper, garbage. The message, along with the garbage
is transmitted over the channel; the recipient then filters out the garbage, leaving only the
message. This procedure is carried out using orthogonal frames. The procedure requires the
construction of orthogonal frames; the easiest way to do this is using Fourier frames (also
called harmonic frames). However, as will be described, these frames are not good for our
purposes here, and so we present several alternative methods for constructing orthogonal
frames.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a short introduction to frames,
and in particular orthogonal frames. In Section 3, we give an account of several methods for
constructing orthogonal frames, with remarks regarding our design goals. In Section 4, we
present the results and conclusions of our numerical experiments and the chosen-plaintext
attack. In the Appendix, we provide psuedocode to describe the experiments.
2. Introduction to Frames
Frames for Hilbert spaces are being used in many signal processing applications such as
sampling theory, multiple access communications, etc. Frames provide redundancy via over-
completeness, where bases do not, and it is this redundancy that makes them advantageous to
use in these settings. In this paper, we will utilize this redundancy of frames for the purpose
of encryption.
Let H be a Hilbert space over the field F with scalar product 〈·, ·〉 and norm ‖ · ‖, where
F denotes either R or C. A frame for H is a sequence X := {xn}n∈Z such that there exist
constants 0 < A ≤ B <∞ such that for all v ∈ H ,
(1) A‖v‖2 ≤
∑
n∈Z
|〈v, xn〉|2 ≤ B‖v‖2.
Clearly, a frame spans the Hilbert space. Moreover, {xn} defines the following frame operator
SX : H → H : v 7→
∑
n∈Z
〈v, xn〉xn
which is positive and invertible. Define {x˜n} ⊂ H , the standard dual of {xn} by x˜n := S−1X xn,
then for all v ∈ H ,
v =
∑
n∈Z
〈v, xn〉x˜n =
∑
n∈Z
〈v, x˜n〉xn.
If A = B = 1, the frame is said to be Parseval, and then for all v ∈ H ,
v =
∑
n∈Z
〈v, xn〉xn.
For elementary frame theory, see [Han et al. 2000, Casazza 2000].
If H is finite dimensional (H will always be assumed to be so from here on, unless
specifically stated), then a frame sequence (possibly finite) is any spanning set {xn} such
that
∑
n∈Z ‖xn‖2 < ∞. If only a finite number of xn’s are non-zero, then {xn} is a finite
frame, and we will discard those that are zero. See [Casazza et al. 2001, Dykema et al. 2003,
Benedetto et al. 2003] for more on finite frames.
For convenience of notation, we make the following definition.
Definition 1. An n × n real matrix, M , is an orthogonal matrix if MTM = kIn for some
constant k.
The (finite) Parseval frames in H are characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H, where H has dimension N . The following are equivalent:
1. {xn} is a Parseval frame for H;
2. the M × N matrix whose ith row is xi (as a row vector) has columns which are or-
thonormal;
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3. there exists a Hilbert space K of dimension M −N and vectors {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K such that
the M ×M matrix formed by 

x1 | y1
... | ...
xM | yM


is a unitary matrix.
Here we write the vectors xi and yi as row vectors with respect to any orthonormal bases
for H and K, respectively.
Proof. The proof of the equivalence of 1 and 2 is in [Benedetto et al. 2003]. The proof of
the equivalence of 1 and 2 is, for infinite frames, contained in [Han et al. 2000, Corollary 1.3,
Theorem 1.7]. The case for finite frames is analogous. 
Remark 1. Another way to view Proposition 1 is that {xn} is a Parseval frame for H if
and only if {xn} is the inner direct summand of an orthonormal basis {xn ⊕ yn} for some
superspace H ⊕K of H .
Definition 2. Two frames {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K are orthogonal if for all v ∈ H,∑M
n=1〈v, xn〉yn = 0.
Proposition 2. Suppose {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K are Parseval frames; they are
orthogonal if and only if 

x1 | y1
... | ...
xM | yM

 := (P |Q)
has columns which form an orthonormal set.
Proof. (⇐) Consider the two matrices P and Q whose rows are {xn} and {yn}, respectively.
A straight forward computation demonstrates that for v ∈ H ,
(2)
M∑
n=1
〈v, xn〉yn = Q∗Pv,
where Q∗ is the conjugate transpose of Q. It follows that if the above matrix has orthonormal
columns, then Q∗P = 0, and thus the frames {xn} and {yn} are orthogonal.
(⇒) Conversely, suppose the Parseval frames are orthogonal. Note that by Proposition 1,
the left part P of the above matrix has orthonormal columns; likewise the right part of the
matrix Q also has orthonormal columns. By equation (2), we must have that the columns
of the left part of the matrix are orthogonal to the columns of the right part of the matrix.
Hence, the columns of the matrix form an orthonormal set. 
Note that if {xn} is orthogonal to {yn}, then {yn} is orthogonal to {xn}.
Let X := {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H ; the analysis operator ΘX of {xn} is given by:
ΘX : H → FM : v 7→ (〈v, x1〉, 〈v, x2〉, . . . , 〈v, xM〉).
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The matrix representation of ΘX is given as the matrix P in Proposition 2. The proof
of Proposition 2 shows that two frames {xn} and {yn} are orthogonal if and only if their
analysis operators ΘX and ΘY have orthogonal ranges in F
M .
2.1. Encryption Using Orthogonal Frames. We present here an overview of our proposed
private key encryption scheme using orthogonal frames. For motivation, consider that the
One-Time Pad is an unconditionally secure cipher, which is optimal of all unconditionally
secure ciphers in terms of key length [Menezes et al. 1997]. Our encryption scheme, which
is similar to a subband coding scheme, is an effort to approximate the One-Time Pad. The
(private) key for this encryption scheme is two orthogonal Parseval frames {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and
{yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K. Let ΘX and ΘY respectively denote their analysis operators. Suppose m ∈ H
is a message; let g ∈ K be a non-zero vector chosen at random. The ciphertext c ∈ FM is
given as follows:
c := ΘXm+ΘYg.
To recover the message, we apply Θ∗
X
:
Θ∗
X
c = Θ∗
X
ΘXm+Θ
∗
X
ΘYg
=
M∑
n=1
〈m, xn〉xn +
M∑
n=1
〈m, yn〉xn
= m+ 0 = m.
There are several things to note about our scheme:
1. The frame {xn} need not be Parseval, but Parseval frames are in general easier to work
with. Since the Parseval frames form only a small subset of all possible frames, using
general frames would allow a much greater choice of specific encryption keys.
2. The frame {yn} need not be Parseval; it need not even be a frame, though again Parseval
frames simplify matters. If {yn} is not a frame, then ΘY has non-trivial kernel, and
ΘYg could be 0 if g is chosen to be in the kernel. (Below we will actually use scalar
multiples of Parseval frames for both {xn} and {yn}.)
3. Just as with the One-Time Pad, when done properly, encoding a message twice results
in two different ciphertexts.
4. Unlike the One-Time Pad, in which a brute force attack results in all possible plaintexts,
it appears unlikely that a brute force attack on our system would result in the same.
Our simulations indicate that an attack produces either a text which is very close to
the original plaintext or is gibberish (see graphs below for more.) However, at this
time, we cannot prove why this is so.
Proposition 3. If {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K are orthogonal frames, then M ≥
dim(H) + dim(K).
Proof. Let ΘX and ΘY be the respective analysis operators. Note that by the (lower) frame
inequality in equation 1, both ΘX and ΘY are one-to-one. Moreover, the orthogonality of the
frames is equivalent to the orthogonality of the ranges of ΘX and ΘY. Combining these two
observations establishes the proposition. 
For convenience, we will assume that M = dim(H) + dim(K). The ciphertext is
c = ΘXm+ΘYg
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where {xn} and {yn} are orthogonal Parseval frames. Since they are orthogonal, we write
c = (ΘX|ΘY)m⊕ g
where the matrix (ΘX|ΘY) is an isometry. Therefore, our encryption procedure involves
generating a large orthogonal matrix.
The next section discusses several ways of constructing such matrices. Since the encryption
scheme is a private key system, we wish to have a relatively small key size; that is to say that
the entire matrix is too much information to be used as the key. We discuss below some of
the strengths and weaknesses of the various construction techniques.
3. Five Encryption Schemes
The cipher algorithm depends upon generating a pair of random orthogonal frames, each
of which is the size of the message. This is equivalent to producing a random orthogonal
matrix of twice the size of the message. We investigate here several methods for doing so.
The first method takes the view of producing orthogonal frames using Fourier frames. The
remaining methods take the view of producing orthogonal matrices.
Once the orthogonal frames, or orthogonal matrix, is determined, the encryption and de-
cryption process is the same. If the frames are given by X and Y, then we write the matrix
(ΘX|ΘY); if on the other hand the matrix is A, we think of A = (ΘX|ΘY). Given a message m,
choose at random a vector g, called the “garbage” or “noise”, and compute (ΘX|ΘY)m⊕g = c
to yield the cipher text c. The recipient computes
(ΘX|ΘY)T c = (ΘX|ΘY)T (ΘX|ΘY)m⊕ g = Km⊕ 0 = Km,
where K is the square of the norm of any column of the matrix ΘX. Dividing by K then
reproduces the message.
3.1. Scheme #1. The first algorithm utilizes the Discrete Cosine Transform. The original
idea came from using the Discrete Fourier transform, which involves complex exponentials.
The Discrete Cosine Transform, in matrix form, is given by:
C = [ckn] =
[
λk
√
2
M
cos
{
kpi
M
(n+ 1/2)
}]
,
where n = 1, . . . ,M , λ1 = 1/
√
2 and λk = 1 for all k = 2, . . . , N . Note that this is normalized
to be a unitary matrix. Assuming that M = 2N , one can permute the columns of C to yield
C ′, and divide the resulting matrix in half vertically:
C ′ = (ΘX|ΘY).
The resulting divided matrix can then be viewed as the analysis operators for two orthogonal
frames, each for RN , consisting of cosine bases projected onto smaller subspaces, (Proposition
2, see also [Aldroubi et al. 2002]). Moreover, the frame vectors can be weighted, which is
accomplished by a diagonal, invertible matrix D. Let P denote a permutation matrix.
The (private) key for the cipher then consists of the matrix D (or simply its diagonal
entries), and the permutation corresponding to P . The encryption algorithm of a message m
of length N then consists of randomly generating a garbage vector g ∈ RN and computing
the ciphertext c:
c = CDP (m⊕ g).
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To decrypt the message, we apply the matrix QP TD−1CT to the ciphertext, where Q is the
projection of RM onto the first N co-ordinates:
QP TD−1CTCDP (m⊕ g) = Q(m⊕ g) = m.
Remark 2. We note that the only knowledge unknown to an adversary is D and P ; the
adversary will know C. Hence, C is irrelevant to the cipher algorithm. Because of this, the
algorithm reduces to rearrangement followed by weighting of the entries of the message and
the garbage. We conclude that our first algorithm is a poor one.
3.2. Scheme #2. The second scheme involves using Hadamard arrays to generate orthogonal
matrices. We first start with the definition of Hadamard arrays. We remark here that this
scheme is related to linear codes [Delsarte et al. 1969].
Definition 3. [Wallis 1972] A Hadamard array H [h, k, λ] based on the indeterminates x1, x2, . . . , xk,
with k ≤ h, is an h× h matrix with entries chosen from {±x1, ±x2, . . . ,±xk} in such a way
that:
1. In any row there are λ entries ±x1, λ entries ±x2, . . . , λ entries ±xk, and similarly
for the columns.
2. The rows and columns are (formally) pairwise orthogonal, respectively.
The matrices we use for our encryption scheme are of h = k, λ = 1. The only possible
Hadamard arrays of this type are for h = 1, 2, 4, 8 [Agaian 1985]. For indeterminants A
through H , we have the Hadamard array
H [8, 8, 1] =


A B C D | E F G H
−B A D −C | F −E −H G
−C −D A B | G H −E −F
−D C −B A | H −G F −E
−E −F −G −H | A B C D
−F E −H G | −B A −D C
−G H E −F | −C D A −B
−H −G F E | −D −C B A


.
For Θ = H [8, 8, 1], ΘTΘ = KI8 where K = A
2 +B2 + · · ·+H2.
The Hadamard arrays allow easy construction of matrices (and hence tight frames) needed
in our encryption schemes. For the encryption process, we now have only Θ to construct
instead of computing the matrices C, D, and P .
The encryption process starts with a message m of arbitrary length, and dividing m into
blocks m1, . . . , mq of length 4 (padding the last block with 0’s if necessary). Then random
vectors g1, . . . , gq of length 4 are chosen, and the matrix N is applied successively to mi⊕ gi.
The ciphertext is then
c = Θ(m1 ⊕ g1)⊕ · · · ⊕Θ(mq ⊕ gq).
The message is then decrypted by dividing c into blocks c1, . . . , cq of size 8, computing
KΘT ci for i = 1, . . . , q, and reconstructing the message using the first four entries of these
resulting blocks.
Remark 3. Because of the ease of construction of the Hadamard arrays, the system is quite
easy to implement. Unlike the first scheme, the key for the recipient has now been reduced
to knowing the chosen entries for Θ, hence in this case the key is the entries A,B, . . . , H of
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the matrix Θ. Since Hadamard arrays are small, however, we wish to find an algorithm to
generate larger orthogonal matrices.
3.3. Scheme # 3. Our next scheme is an attempt to produce larger orthogonal matrices.
Starting with Hadamard arrays A and M with ATA = kI8 and M
TM = pI8 for constants k
and p, we construct a new 16× 16 orthogonal matrix
S =
[
A MA
−MTA A
]
.
Repeat this procedure with Hadamard arrays B and N to get
T =
[
B NB
−NTB B
]
.
The matrices S and T are then used to construct a 32× 32 orthogonal matrix:
U =
[
S TS
−T TS S
]
.
This “blow up” construction is iterated to get the appropriate size matrix for our plain text.
Remark 4. In this encryption scheme, the key is the entries of the matrices A, B, M , N , etc.,
and their positions in the construction. This method, however is computationally inefficient.
3.4. Scheme #4. We first define the tensor product, ⊗, of two matrices, A and B. The
sizes of the matrices is irrelevant.
Definition 4. [van Lint 1992] Let
A =

a11 a12 · · · a1n... . . .
am1 am2 · · · amn

 .
Then
A⊗B :=

a11B a12B · · · a1nB... . . .
am1B am2B · · · amnB

 .
If A is an m× n and B is a p× q, then A⊗ B is an mp× nq matrix. The tensor product
will be the critical element of construction in this and the next scheme. Note that if A and
B are orthogonal matrices, then A⊗ B is also an orthogonal matrix.
Definition 5. A Hadamard matrix is a square orthogonal matrix with entries consisting of
±1’s.
We start with an Hadamard matrix (not an array), H , of a chosen size 2p, and then two
Hadamard arrays, A and B of choice sizes 2,4, or 8. We then construct the new matrix via
the tensor products:
C =
[
H ⊗ A (H ⊗B)(H ⊗ A)
−(H ⊗ B)T (H ⊗ A) H ⊗ A
]
.
C is now an orthogonal matrix. This matrix is size adaptive with respect to powers of 2 since
each matrix is of some order of 2, and the size of H can be chosen.
8 RYAN HARKINS, ERIC WEBER, AND ANDREW WESTMEYER
However, the Hadamard matrix property that HTH = In is actually a disadvantage. Let
H =


1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1

 .
Then our matrix is
C =
[
H ⊗ A (H ⊗B)(H ⊗ A)
−(H ⊗ B)T (H ⊗ A) H ⊗ A
]
=


A A A A | 4BA 0 0 0
A −A A −A | 0 4BA 0 0
A A −A −A | 0 0 4BA 0
A −A −A A | 0 0 0 4BA
− − − − | − − − −
−4BTA 0 0 0 | A A A A
0 −4BTA 0 0 | A −A A −A
0 0 −4BTA 0 | A A −A −A
0 0 0 −4BTA | A −A −A A


.
The resulting matrix is relatively sparse, which is undesirable for maintaining secrecy.
3.5. Scheme #5. We choose p Hadamard arrays H1, H2, . . . , Hp. Each array can have its
own size, say ei × ei for 1 ≤ i ≤ p, where each ei is either 2,4, or 8. We then construct our
e1e2 · · · ep-sized matrix M by the tensor product of these p matrices:
M =
p⊗
i=1
Hi := H1 ⊗H2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hp.
The ciphertext then is c = M(m⊕ g). With this construction, we eliminate the sparsity that
was shown in scheme #4. Note that the key in this case is the entries of the first rows of H1
to Hp, hence is an array of numbers of size e1 + e2 + · · ·+ ep, and hence is relatively small.
We ran some numerical experiments, using scheme #5 to obtain information regarding
several things:
1. We wanted to see if a brute force attack would be a feasible way of defeating the
cipher. The results of the experiments and also the computations below suggest that
the answer is no.
2. One advantage of the One Time Pad is that a brute force attack results in all possible
plaintext messages, forcing an adversary to choose which was the original message. We
wanted to determine if this was also true of our proposed cipher. The results of our
experiments indicate that the answer to this is also no.
3. Finally, we wanted to determine if the size of the entries of the garbage vector g
mattered. The experiments and the computations below suggest that the answer is
yes.
The results of our experiments, in the form of graphs, are given below.
ENCRYPTION USING FRAMES 9
4. Experimental Results and Conclusions
We want to know how accurate a guess has to be in order to break the cipher. We suppose
that an adversary knows that we are using scheme #5, that is the adversary knows the
structure of the matrix M , but not the entries. We let M be the original matrix of size n, M˜
be the adversary’s guess, and w be the original plaintext m concatenated with the garbage
g (i.e. w = m ⊕ g). Then we consider w˜ := (1/k˜)M˜TMw where k˜ = ‖M˜‖2. Since we
assume that the structure of M is known by the adversary, we consider M˜ = M + P , where
P is a matrix with the same structure as M . For simplicity, we let Mi denote the ith row
of the matrix M and likewise for P . Note that k = 〈Mi,Mi〉 since (1/k)MTM = In, and
k˜ = 〈M˜i, M˜i〉 = 〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉 = ||Mi||2 + 2〈Mi, Pi〉+ ||Pi||2.
We rewrite to get the following:
(1/k˜)M˜TM = (k/k˜)I + (1/k˜)P TM =
〈Mi,Mi〉
〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉I +
1
〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉

〈P
T
1
,MT
1
〉 · · · 〈P T
1
,MTn 〉
...
. . .
〈P Tn ,MT1 〉 · · · 〈P Tn ,MTn 〉

 .
Let w˜ = (w˜1, w˜2, . . . , w˜n) . Then we have that for 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
w˜j =


〈P Tj ,MTj 〉+ 〈Mj,Mj〉
〈Mj + Pj,Mj + Pj〉 wj +
n∑
i = 1
i 6= j
〈P Tj ,MTi 〉
〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉wi


For an adversary’s guess to be close,
〈P Tj ,MTj 〉+ 〈Mj ,Mj〉
〈Mj + Pj,Mj + Pj〉 ≈ 1
and
n∑
i = 1
i 6= j
〈P Tj ,MTi 〉
〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉 ≈ 0.
We break this up into cases.
Case 1: Assume ||P || is relatively large compared to ‖M‖; that is, the guess is far from the
actual matrix. We have∣∣∣∣ 〈P Ti ,MTi 〉〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ 〈P Ti ,MTi 〉||Mi||2 + 2〈Pi,Mi〉+ ||Pi||2
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣ 〈P Ti ,MTi 〉/||Pi||2(||Mi||2/||Pi||2) + (2〈Pi,Mi〉/||Pi||2) + 1
∣∣∣∣→ 0 as ||P || → ∞.
However, when we look at the w˜i coefficients, we see the following:∣∣∣∣ 〈Mj ,Mj〉〈Mj + Pj,Mj + Pj〉
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ (〈Mj ,Mj〉/||Pj||2)(||Mi||2/||Pi||2) + (2〈Pi,Mi〉/||Pi||2) + 1
∣∣∣∣→ 0 as ||Pj|| → ∞.
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Case 2: We assume ||P || is small relative to ||M ||; that is, the guess is close. Then we have
using the same arguments:∣∣∣∣ 〈P Ti ,Mi〉〈Mi + Pi,Mi + Pi〉
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ 〈P Ti ,Mi〉||Mi||2 + 2〈Mi, Pi〉+ ||Pi||2
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣ 〈P Ti ,Mi〉/||Mi||21 + (2〈Mi, Pi〉/||Mi||2) + (||Pi||2/||Mi||2)
∣∣∣∣→ 0 as ||Pi|| → 0.
So, the better the guess, the smaller the ‘extra’ coefficients will be. Likewise, for the
w˜j coefficients,∣∣∣∣〈Mj ,Mj〉〈Mj, Pj〉
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ ||Mj||2||Mj ||2 + 2〈Mj, Pj〉+ ||Pj||2
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣ 11 + (2〈Mj , Pj〉/||Mj||2) + (||Pj||2/||Mj||2)
∣∣∣∣→ 1 as ||Pj|| → 0.
Our first question is whether an adversary can figure out how small the perturbation P
must be in order to get a ”good guess”. The adversary knows the size of M and ||Mw||;
we assume additionally that the adversary knows the structure of M . For convenience,
assume that the encryption matrix M = A ⊗ B ⊗ C for 3 Hadamard arrays, A,B, and
C. We then let M˜ = (A + a) ⊗ (B + b) ⊗ (C + c) for (small norm) perturbation matrices
a, b and c. We reformulate our question: How big can ||a||, ||b||, and ||c|| be such that
||MTMw−M˜TMw|| < ε, where ε is some acceptable tolerance for error? (Here, for a matrix
A, ‖A‖ denotes the operator norm of A. Below, ‖ · ‖ shall denote both Hilbert space norm
for vectors and operator norm for matrices.)
We let ||a|| ≈ ||b|| ≈ ||c|| ≈ β and ||A|| ≈ ||B|| ≈ ||C|| ≈ γ. We may assume that γ ≫ β.
If we write out M˜ in terms of the tensor products, we get
M˜ = A⊗ B ⊗ C + A⊗B ⊗ c + · · ·+ a⊗ b⊗ c and ||M˜ || ≤ γ3 + 3γ2β + 3γβ2 + β3.
Given any ε > 0, we choose δ = ε/||Mw||. If |3γ2β| < δ, then
||MTMw − M˜TMw|| ≤ ||MT − M˜T ||||Mw|| ≤ (3γ2β + 3γβ2 + β3)||Mw||
≈ 3(γ2β)||Mw|| < δ||Mw|| = ε.
These computations suggest that the larger the entries of the garbage vector g are, the
closer a guess must be in order to reasonably recover the message. This is corroborated
by the experiments we ran (see the graphs below). Thus, we can control the accuracy an
adversary would need in order to break the cipher.
4.1. Chosen-Plaintext Attack. We will demonstrate here a chosen-plaintext attack on the
cipher which will break the system. A chosen-plaintext attack is an attack mounted by an
adversary which chooses a plaintext and is then given the corresponding ciphertext.
Theorem 1. The encryption algorithm proposed above is vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext
attack.
Proof. We assume the adversary knows the length of the message band and subsequently the
length of the noise band. Let the length of the message band be Nm and the length of the
noise band be Nn. The attack is as follows:
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Step 1. Determine the range of the noise band K of Θ. That is, determine (ΘX|ΘY)(0⊕RNn).
Choose any plaintext m of size Nm. Encode the plaintext twice, with output, say, e0
and e1. Compute e1−e0 = Θ(m⊕g1)−Θ(m⊕g0) = Θ(0⊕g1−0⊕g0). Notice that this
yields a vector f1 = Θ(0⊕ g1− 0⊕ g0) in the range of the noise band of Θ. Encode the
plaintext a third time, with output e2, and compute f2 = e2 − e0. Compute f3, . . . , fm
until the collection {f1, . . . , fm} contain a linearly independent subset of size Nn. This
determines the range of the noise band K of Θ.
Step 2. Determine the range of the message band T of Θ. That is, determine what is (ΘX|ΘY)(RNm⊕
0). Choose any plaintext m1 of size Nm; encode the plaintext, with output e1; then
project e1 onto the orthogonal complement of K. This yields a vector x1 in T . Choose
another plaintext m2 and repeat, yielding vector x2 ∈ T . Repeat until the collection
{x1, . . . , xq} contains a linearly independent subset of size Nm. This set determines T .
Step 3. Determine the message part of Θ. That is, determine ΘX. Suppose in Step 2, {m1, . . . , mNm}
is such that {x1, . . . , xNm} is linearly independent. If we write Θ = (ΘX|ΘY), then we
now have the following system of equations:
(ΘX|ΘY)mk ⊕ 0 = xk for k = 1, . . . Nm.
Given this system of equations, now solve for ΘX.
Step 4. Unencode ciphertexts. Given any ciphertext e, the adversary computes the following:
K−1(ΘX|0)Te = K−1(ΘX|0)T (ΘX|ΘY)m⊕ g
= K−1ΘT
X
ΘXm
= m
where K is the square of the norm of any column of ΘX.

4.2. Concluding Remarks. The proposed cipher appears to be robust to brute force at-
tacks, but is not robust against a chosen-plaintext attack. We mention, however, that we do
not know if the scheme is robust to a known-plaintext attack. Moreover, this is a private
symmetric key cipher; it would be desirable if this method could be altered to be used as a
public key cipher. We reiterate that the McEliece cipher is a public key system and is similar
in flavor to the cipher presented here.
The ultimate downfall of the cipher is the linearity. We suggest that perhaps there is
possibly a way of introducing non-linearity into the algorithm to defeat a chosen-plaintext
attack. However, at this point, we know of no methods to accomplish this.
5. Pseudo-Code
5.1. Encoder.cpp.
1. Calculate Matrix
(a) Input the possible range of entries for A, B, C
(b) Make A, B, C either 4x4 or 8x8 Hadamard arrays with entries chosen randomly
from the range (for simplicity, we are using the 4x4 Hadamard array)
(c) Compute tensor product A⊕B ⊕ C
2. Encode Message
12 RYAN HARKINS, ERIC WEBER, AND ANDREW WESTMEYER
(a) Compute m ⊕ g by converting the message to ASCII and filling g with random
numbers
(b) Compute (A⊗B ⊗ C)(m⊕ g)
5.2. Hacker.cpp. Hacker.cpp–this code attempts a brute force method on a cypher text.
1. Input min, max, range of key guesses
2. Input ciphertext
3. For all possible values of the twelve variables in use
(a) Fill the matrices with the possible values
(b) Tensor matrices together
(c) Calculate possible text messages
(d) Output text to file for later examination
5.3. Analyzer.cpp. This code takes the output of Hacker.cpp and calculates the frequency
of occurrence of every ASCII symbol.
1. For each line of text, count number of appearances of each ASCII value
2. Output information to text file
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6. Graphs
How to read the following graphs. We carried out the following computations to simulate
a brute force attack on the cipher:
1. for a sample plaintext, encode the plaintext using scheme #5 making the following
choices: approximate entry size for the matrices and approximate size for the garbage
entries;
2. decode the ciphertext using every combination of key entry and key entry ±1;
3. converted the decoded ciphertext in the previous step to ASCII values;
4. counted the appearance of each value in the resulting combinations.
The graphs represent the number of appearances within all possible key guesses from step 2
above. The plaintext is given in the title of the graph; the ASCII values are the x-axis of the
graph, and the approximate key sizes and garbage sizes are given in the graph captions.
Note that in figures 3 and 7, the key size and garbage size are the same. The graphs show
that most of the characters that appear in the simulated brute force attack are those that
are in the original message.
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